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ABSTRACT
Web applications in widespread use have always been the
target of large-scale attacks, leading to massive disruption
of services and financial loss, as in the Equifax data breach.
It has become common practice to deploy web application
in containers like Docker for better portability and ease of
deployment. We design a system called AppMine for light-
weight monitoring of web applications running in Docker
containers and detection of unknown web vulnerabilities.
AppMine is an unsupervised learning system, trained only on
legitimate workloads of web application, to detect anomalies
based on either traditional models (PCA and one-class SVM),
or more advanced neural-network architectures (LSTM). In
our evaluation, we demonstrate that the neural network
model outperforms more traditional methods on a range
of web applications and recreated exploits. For instance,
AppMine achieves average AUC scores as high as 0.97 for the
Apache Struts application (with the CVE-2017-5638 exploit
used in the Equifax breach), while the AUC scores for PCA
and one-class SVM are 0.81 and 0.83, respectively.
1 INTRODUCTION
Web-based attacks remain one of the major attack vectors
with notorious security incidents such as the Equifax breach
and Drupalgeddon being attributed to web application vul-
nerabilities [20]. Such attacks already resulted in serious
breaches of confidential and personal information affecting
consumers and businesses alike. For instance, the Equifax
security incident from 2017 impacted approximately 143 mil-
lion U.S. consumers, compromising their identity (e.g., SSN,
driver license) and financial information (e.g., credit card
numbers) [9]. We thus expect that cyber security attacks will
induce even more devastating consequences in the future.
The majority of web applications today are distributed in
Docker containers [5] to run in either public cloud or private
cloud environments. While containers offer flexibility, scala-
bility, and have low performance overhead, on the downside
existing defenses for enterprise networks (e.g., anti-virus,
intrusion prevention systems, web proxies) are not readily ap-
plicable in container-based environments. Existing solutions
based on static analysis, dynamic analysis, input validation,
and fuzz testing have well-known limitations.
In this paper we design an unsupervised learning frame-
work called AppMine for web application defense that is
effective at protecting container-based applications against a
range of vulnerabilities. Our framework monitors web appli-
cations deployed in Docker containers and collects detailed
run-time information using well-known monitoring tools
such as Sysdig [37]. At the core of the technical approach lies
a machine learning framework that uses Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) architectures popular in the deep learning
community for representing sequential dependencies in time-
series data. We use a type of RNN called Long-Short Term
Memory (LSTM), which can capture the time evolution of
application profiles, learn both short-term and long-term
dependencies, and identify security anomalies that deviate
from historical behavior.
To evaluate our techniques, we deploy a testbed in which
we set up four popular web application in Docker contain-
ers, and recreate seven exploits, using Metasploit modules.
We collect system call data using the Sysdig monitoring
agent. We compare our LSTM model with two traditional
anomaly detection algorithms: Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA) and One-Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM).
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework at detect-
ing well-known vulnerabilities such as those in the Apache
Struts and Drupal applications with low false positive rates.
Our LSTM model significantly improves upon more tradi-
tional anomaly detectionmodels, by exploiting the dependen-
cies in sequences of system calls over time. For instance, for
the Apache Struts web application with the CVE-2017-5638
exploit used in the Equifax breach, the LSTM model achieves
an AUC of 0.97, while PCA and OCSVM have AUCs of 0.81
and 0.83, respectively. The advantages of ourAppMine frame-
work are that it does not require attack data for training, and
it can be applied to detect unknown vulnerabilities in web
applications.
To summarize, our contributions are:
(1) We design an unsupervised learning framework called
AppMine for detection of a range of web application
vulnerabilities.
(2) We set up a testbed with four web applications and
recreate seven exploits, collecting monitoring data
from Sysdig agents deployed in Docker containers.
(3) We compare the performance of our neural-network
LSTM model with that of traditional unsupervised
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learning models (PCA and OCSVM) and demonstrate
its effectiveness.
Organization. We provide background on web application
vulnerabilities and our threat model in Section 2. We describe
our methodology, testbed setup, data collection, and machine
learning framework in Section 3. We evaluate our system
AppMine on a range of web applications and vulnerabili-
ties in Section 4. We present related work in Section 5 and
conclude in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
We first provide some background on web application vulner-
abilities, then discuss our threat model, and give an overview
of our system AppMine.
2.1 Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications can be deployed either on-premise (in pri-
vate clouds and data centers) or off-premise (in public cloud
environments). A recent trend is to containerize web applica-
tions, which involves running them in Docker containers for
increased portability across different hardware and software
stacks.
Vulnerabilities in web and database applications might
expose enterprise networks to serious security breaches. For
instance, several remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-
18-9805 and CVE-18-11775) have been discovered for Apache
Struts, a Java open source framework for developing web
applications. Among these, the famous Apache Struts vul-
nerability CVE-2017-5638 allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary commands on the web server via the Content Type
HTTP header. After getting access to the web server, attack-
ers start propagating laterally in the network and reach the
target of interest (usually a database storing confidential in-
formation). Other web vulnerabilities include SQL injection,
cross-site scripting, and cross-site request forgery.
Defenses against these application vulnerabilities usually
involve patching vulnerable applications, after the exploit
is known and a patch is available. Web application security
testing tools use a combination of static code analysis [14],
dynamic checks [38], input validation [32], and fuzz test-
ing [31], but in general they have a number of well-known
limitations (e.g., high false positives or false negatives). In
general, despite all existing defenses, enterprises are still
exposed against zero-day vulnerabilities in their web appli-
cations.
2.2 Threat model
We consider a system model in which web applications run
in container environments such as Docker and monitoring
agents are deployed in the containers. We assume that the
containers themselves and the monitoring agents that col-
lect the monitoring data are not under the attacker’s control.
Attackers are performing their actions remotely, interacting
with the web application via network packets. We also as-
sume that the adversary cannot tamper with the collected
system call data. Attackers with access to the monitoring
environment and the system logs are much more powerful,
and are beyond our current scope.
We thus handle scenarios in which attackers interact re-
motely with the web application, attempting to exploit a vul-
nerability, and get full access to the application running en-
vironment (i.e., the Docker container in our setup). The web
application attack is usually an entry point for the attacker,
interested in moving laterally in the environment (cloud or
enterprise) and obtaining access to critical resources. For
instance, in the Equifax breach, the Struts exploit allowed
the attacker control of the web server, but the attacker’s ulti-
mate goal was obtaining access to the personal information
of millions of customers.
2.3 Overview
In designing our machine learning framework for web ap-
plication threat detection, we leverage several main insights.
First, there is a large amount of sequential dependence in ap-
plication behavior manifested in unique, highly distinguish-
able sequences of system calls generated by an application.
We argue that machine-learning techniques applied to appli-
cation monitoring independently of their temporal ordering,
long-term dependencies, and contextual information do not
offer sufficient protection against advanced attacks. There-
fore, we design machine learning architectures that leverage
the sequential and contextual dependencies in application
monitoring data. Second, we believe that application exploits
and cyber attacks will result in deviation of monitoring data
compared to an application running under normal condi-
tions without exposure to the attack or vulnerability. To the
extent the attack is observable in the collected monitoring
data depends on a number of factors including the attack
specifics and the granularity of collected data. Third, by en-
capsulating single applications in each container, we can
reduce the amount of noise from events generated by other
applications, and create “clean profiles” of typical enterprise
applications.
A number of challenges need to be addressed in design-
ing our machine learning-based application threat detection
framework. We highlight among them: (1) privacy and per-
formance considerations that prevent full-blown application
monitoring; (2) dealing with non-deterministic application
behavior; (3) designing the most appropriate machine learn-
ing models for this setting. There is a lot of research and
guidance on designing neural network architectures for other
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Figure 1: Overview of the AppMine system architecture.
domains (e.g., image classification, speech recognition, ma-
chine translation), but there is no widely accepted methodol-
ogy for security datasets that exhibit different semantics.
Figure 1 provides an overview of our machine learning
framework including the following components: (1) Testbed
setup to run variousweb applications and emulate legitimate
behavior; (2) Vulnerability exploitation to reproduce ex-
isting vulnerabilities using Metasploit; (3) Data collection
using the Sysdig monitoring agent installed in the Docker
container environment; (4)Machine Learning Anomaly
Detection Framework supporting both traditional and deep-
learning based models. We detail each of these components
in the next section.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section we discuss our system methodology. We start
by describing the testbed setup, the vulnerability exploita-
tion method, and the data collection. Finally, we describe
in detail our unsupervised machine learning framework for
web application vulnerability detection.
3.1 Testbed setup
Cloud providers that deploy containerized web applications
might leverage existing monitoring tools and obtain data
from realistic user interactions with the web applications.
However, potential privacy implications prevent these providers
to perform detailed monitoring and release their datasets
to the broader community. As we do not have access to
datasets collected from deployed web applications, we create
our own monitoring environment for applications deployed
in Docker containers. We set up an Ubuntu 16.04 Virtual
Machine running Docker and install the Sysdig monitoring
agent. For each considered web application, we built and de-
ployed Docker containers on the Ubuntu machine. We used
a separate Kali Linux 2 based Virtual Machine to run the
scripts for generating the attack data using Metasploit. We
discuss now in more details the choice of web applications,
how we generate realistic legitimate workloads, and how we
set up the exploit emulation.
Web applications. The web applications we selected in-
clude: Apache Struts [20] (two different variants), Drupal [6],WordPress[40]
(three different plugins [41–43]), and ProFTPD [27]. All of
these are popular, open-source web applications that experi-
enced vulnerabilities in the last few years.
To select exploits of interest for these applications, we
evaluated recent exploits from the CVE database and iden-
tified a set of seven exploits that had Metasploit modules.
Table 1 details the application description and vulnerabilities
that we emulate in our environment. We include CVE num-
bers for five out of the seven exploits, as the other two do
not yet have a CVE number assigned. The CVE-2017-5638
for Apache Struts is the famous remote code execution vul-
nerability that led to the Equifax data breach.
Legitimate workloads. One of the main challenges in our
work is setting up workloads and interactions with the web
applications that are similar to those generated by actual
users. For this purpose, we found traditional web crawling
to be unsuitable, as it focuses more on gathering data in
an automatic manner than on creating realistic, human-like
interaction. Thus, we designed Interactor, a program that
uses Selenium [33] to realistically interact with elements on
the web interface of the web application. Interactor opens
a browser instance per user and interacts with the page
by filling available forms, clicking hyperlinks, and pressing
buttons in a randomized order. Small, random delays of 1-5
seconds are also inserted during the operation of Interactor,
so it simulates user behavior more realistically than a web
3
App Name Description Plugin Name CVE
Struts Framework for developing Java EE webapps - CVE-2017-5638CVE-2017-9805
Drupal Content-management framework - CVE-2018-7600
WordPress Content management system
Reflex Gallery Plugin CVE-2015-4133
Ajax Load More Plugin -
N-Media Website Contact Form -
ProFTPD FTP server - CVE-2015-3306
Table 1: Open-source web applications and vulnerabilities considered for this work.
scraper. Data collection for Struts, Drupal andWordpress was
done using Interactor. For ProFTPD, we chose to leverage
ftpbench [11] for data generation, a benchmark tool that
enables user login to an FTP sever and uploading files of
different sizes.
3.2 Vulnerability exploitation
The Metasploit Framework [23] is an open source project
that serves as a penetration testing platform for finding and
exploiting vulnerabilities. For our work, we used existing
Metasploit modules for the tested vulnerabilities and modi-
fied them as necessary to work on our versions of the web
applications. Additionally, Metasploit comes with a set of
post-exploitation information gathering modules that can
be run on compromised machines, and we used them after
exploiting each web application to ensure that we gained
access to the victim. This step replicates a likely scenario
in real-world exploitation, where information gathering is
often the first step an attacker takes after compromising a
system, so as to learn the victim’s system and network con-
figuration and discover more vulnerabilities. Table 2 lists
the post-exploitation scripts we tested and collected data for.
They include gather network information, collect system
information, user list, and credentials, and dump password
hash files.
3.3 Data collection
We use Sysdig [37] to monitor the activity of the web appli-
cations running in Docker containers. Sysdig has the ability
to collect sequences of system calls made by the application
in the container.
For each application except ProFTPD, we ran our Interac-
tor program to emulate 1, 3, 5, 10 and 15 simultaneous users.
Each user performed a number of actions chosen randomly
between 50 and 100, where an action is an activity such as
clicking on a hyperlink, button on the web page, or filling a
form. Monitoring was started after running the containers,
and ended when the last user had performed his last action.
For ProFTPD, we used the login and upload benchmarks
from ftpbench [11] for 30 mins to 1 hour each to generate
legitimate data. For attack data, Sysdig monitoring and data
collection was done similarly.
Table 3 shows the data statistics for the four applications
we monitored. In total, we collected between 300 and 360
minutes of data for each applications and vulnerability. We
split the sessions into training and testing for the machine
learning framework, to minimize correlation and ensure in-
dependence of training and testing data. In Figure 2, we show
the distribution of the top 20 system calls during legitimate
use for the WordPress application over a duration of approx-
imately 15 seconds. The attack is being performed against
the N-media contact form plugin, and the post-exploit script
being run is enum_network. Clearly, the system calls during
the attack script are noticeably distinguishable from the ones
used during the regular application runs. Notably, some sys-
tem calls (e.g., fcntl, close) are used more frequently during
the attack.
3.4 Machine Learning Framework
AppMine uses an unsupervised learning framework for web
vulnerability detection. Our motivation in adopting unsuper-
vised learning includes: (1) not relying on attack data in the
training phase; and (2) the ability to generalize for detecting
new, unseen vulnerabilities. However, it is well known that
anomaly detection techniques in security typically generate
large amounts of false positives and are challenging to tune
in operational settings [35]. We address this challenge by us-
ing the sequential and temporal dependencies in application
system call data.
Training and testing the models. As shown in Figure 1,
AppMine leverages only legitimate application data for train-
ing a machine learning model that learns the system call
distribution under normal conditions. As already mentioned,
we vary the number of users and their actions to create a
set of diverse legitimate workloads for training the models.
AppMine creates system-call based feature representations
for time windows of fixed length. Depending on the ML tech-
nique, the feature vector for either one time interval or a
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Post-exploit script name Description
checkcontainer Check whether target running inside container
ecryptfs_creds Collect all users’ .ecrypts directories
enum_configs Collect configuration files for Apache, MySQL, etc.
enum_network Gather network information
enum_protections Find antivirus/IDS/firewalls etc
enum_psk Collect 802-11-Wireless-Security credentials
enum_system Gather system information (e.g., installed packages)
enum_users_history Gather user list, bash history, vim history, etc.
enum_xchat Gather XChat’s configuration files
env Collect environment variables
gnome_commander_creds Collect cleartext passwords from Gnome-commander
hashdump Dump password hashes for all users
mount_cifs_creds Obtain mount.cifs/mount.smbfs credentials from /etc/fstab
pptpd_chap_secrets Collect PPTP VPN information
tor_hiddenservices Collect TOR Hidden Services hostnames and private keys
Table 2: Metasploit post-exploitation scripts used for generating attack data.
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Figure 2: System call distribution for 15 seconds of data for WordPress, attack being shown in red is the
enum_network script
sequence of time intervals are given as input to the ML algo-
rithm. The output of the training phase is a model that can
determine the likelihood of a certain sequence of system calls.
Importantly, as each application exhibits different behavior,
we train a model per application to learn the application
normal behavior.
At testing time, the application model is applied to new
data generated by the same web application. We run the
5
App/Plugin Name Training data Legitimate testing data
Struts CVE-2017-5638 282.42 mins 13.46 mins
Struts CVE-2017-9805 308.78 mins 28 mins
Drupal CVE-2018-7600 301.76 mins 17.45 mins
WP Reflex Gallery Plugin 323.15 mins 16.54 mins
WP Ajax Load More Plugin 317.27 mins 22.42 mins
WP N-Media Website Contact Form 321.05 mins 18.64 mins
ProFTPD CVE-2015-3306 342.85 mins 20 mins
Table 3: Amount of data used for training and validation.
model on both legitimate and attack data for that application.
The model produces an anomaly score for the feature vectors
at a particular timewindow, indicating the likelihood that the
application has been exploited in that time interval. Based
on the labeled ground truth, we compute standard metrics
such as True Positives, False Positives, and Area Under the
Curve (AUC). A graphical representation of our anomaly
detection models is given in Figure 3.
Traditional anomaly detection techniques. As mentioned,
Sysdig collects time-stamped sequences of system calls for
web applications. The first question we had to answer was
how to represent this data for use in an anomaly detection
system. A simple and fairly common representation (see, for
example, [8]) is to create a feature vector x t = [f t1 , . . . , f ts ]
storing the frequency for each system call during a fixed
time interval t . Here s is the total number of system calls
and f ti denotes the number of times the i-th system call
has been used during time window t . The interval length
is a hyper-parameter of the system. System calls that did
not appear in that interval had a frequency value of 0. For
intervals where no system calls were captured by Sysdig,
a feature vector of all zeros was used. For example, let us
assume that a program makes the following system calls
during a one-second interval:
futex,futex,open,write,close,open,read,close
Then, the feature vector for that interval is (system call exec
is not used and has value 0)
close futex open write read exec
2 2 2 1 1 0
We use two standard anomaly detection techniques: Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA) and One Class Support
Vector Machine (OCSVM) based on this frequency feature
representation. Both of these methods take as input the sys-
tem call frequency feature vector computed for one time
interval. We use these methods to create baselines for com-
parison with our neural-network based anomaly detection
model that leverages the sequence dependencies among sys-
tem calls.
PCA: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a technique
that projects a dataset onto a set of principal components, de-
termined to maximize the variance observed in the training
data. If the original data is given by matrix X (with n rows
and d columns, where n is the number of data records in X
and d is the size of the feature space), then PCA determines
the top k eigenvectors of the co-variance matrix Σ = XTX .
Let the matrix of the top k eigenvectors beWk (storing one
eigenvector per column). Then the projection of a point x
onto the space generated by the top k principal components
is given by xˆ = W Tk x . The principal components have the
property of minimizing the total reconstruction error. PCA
can also be trained as a density estimation model, which
estimates a probability distribution p(x) over x ∈ X (in our
case for frequency feature vectors), based on Maximum Like-
lihood estimation [3]. We use this density-estimation variant
of PCA. In training we compute Gaussian estimates of the
probabilities of system call frequency vectors, while in test-
ing we compute log likelihoods for both attack and legitimate
data. If a point has very low log likelihood in testing, then
we consider it as an attack point. We vary the threshold for
log likelihood in order to obtain ROC curves that evaluate
True Positives as a function of fixed False Positive Rates.
OCSVM: A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised
learning model that is trained on data points from two dif-
ferent classes, in an attempt to find a separating hyperplane
that separates the classes by the maximal margin. One-class
SVM is trained on data from only one class (in our case, the
legitimate class) and is used to detect novelties (or anomalies)
based on the learned representation. We learn a one-class
SVM model based on the legitimate training data, and use
it to predict scores for testing data points (both attack and
legitimate). In this setting, the scores are the distances to the
separating decision boundary. Again, we vary the scores for
which we predict attacks, to compute True Positives at fixed
False Positive Rates.
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Figure 3: Machine Learningmethods in AppMine. Traditional models on the left and the LSTMmodel on the right.
Learning application profiles using LSTM. To capture se-
quential dependencies in application monitoring data, we
leverage Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) architectures.
RNNs are deep learning models designed to map sequen-
tial and time series data to sequential outputs [30]. RNNs
have been successfully applied for tasks such as machine
translation, but it was observed that in simple RNN archi-
tectures several problems arise during training. In particular,
vanishing gradients and exploding gradients might prevent
the network from training accurately when gradients need
to be back-propagated through multi-layer networks. Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks [12] are special types
of RNNs that introduce special forget gates to better preserve
long-term dependencies by mitigating the vanishing gradi-
ent problem. They maintain a hidden state ht at time t that
is updated using the current input: (ht ,x ′t+1) = fW (ht−1,xt ).
HereW are the model weights, fW is the function applied
inside the neural network (including the linear operation
and activation function), xt is the input to the network at
time t , and x ′t+1 is the prediction of feature vector at time
t + 1.
We designed an LSTM architecture that learns a model
fW mapping sequences of system call frequency vectors to pre-
dictions of the next feature vector. In particular, given a se-
quence of size ∆, the model takes as input the system call fre-
quency vectors for the last∆ timewindows:xt ,xt−1, . . . ,xt−∆+1
and predicts the next frequency vector:x ′t+1 ← fW (xt , . . . ,xt−∆+1).
During training, we have information about the true value
of the system call frequency vector xt+1 at time t + 1 and we
measure the distance between the predicted value and the
actual value. We found that using a standard distance metric
(such as Euclidean distance) | |xt+1 − x ′t+1 | |2 is not effective.
Instead, we leverage ideas from Term Frequency - Inverse
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) in information retrieval and
we weight each system call by its inverse frequency when
defining a new distance between the predicted and actual
values: | |x ′t+1 −xt+1 | |S =
√∑d
i=1 f¯i (x t+1i − x ′t+1i )2, where d is
the number of system calls, and f¯i is the inverse-frequency
of the ith system call as seen during training.
During trainingwe run the LSTMmodel only on legitimate
data x1, . . . ,xt , . . . (sequence of system call frequency vec-
tors) and we compute all the weighted Euclidian distances be-
tween predicted and actual frequency vectors. We determine
an anomaly threshold based on the distribution of distances
for each application. The threshold is chosen to minimize
the false positive rate (i.e., legitimate values xt with distance
higher than the threshold T ). This is equivalent to picking a
threshold T such as the probability P[| |x ′t − xt | |S > T ] <= p,
for some fixed false positive rate p.
During testing, we run the LSTM model on new data
y1, . . . ,yt , . . . (including legitimate and attack vectors), and
predict at each time interval the frequency vector y ′t =
fW (yt−1, . . . , Ft−∆) based on the previous ∆ frequency vec-
tors:yt−1, . . . ,yt−∆. We consider the frequency vector at time
t an anomaly if the distance is higher than the threshold:
| |y ′t − yt | |S > T .
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our three anomaly detection
models, using metrics such as True Positives at fixed False
Positive rates, and Area Under the Curve (AUC). We first dis-
cuss hyper-parameter choice, then compare the performance
of LSTM with that of the traditional ML models (PCA and
OCSVM), and finally we present detailed attack detection
results per attack script.
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Configuring ML models. We describe here some of the
configuration options and hyper-parameter selection for our
models.
For PCA we need to select the number of components. For
all of the tested web applications, the cumulative variance
graph started to flatten out at around 20 principal compo-
nents. Figure 4 shows an example for Struts (other applica-
tions being similar). Thus, we choose to represent the data
using 20 principal components when running the PCAmodel.
PCA assigns scores to each data point based on how far the
projection of the data point on the lower dimensional space
lies from the principal components. Normal, benign data
points are expected to have a low score, while anomalous
points will have higher scores.
As described in 3.4, we trained our models on frequency
count vectors. We tested time interval lengths of 100ms,
500ms, 1s, and 2s for creating feature vectors, and choose to
work with one second as for the other options the results
were worse (the ROC curves were closer to the diagonal).
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Figure 4: Cumulative explained variance for PCA for
Struts with CVE-2017-5638.
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Figure 5: Distribution of distances between predicted
and actual frequency values for the enum_configs at-
tack script for Struts with CVE-2017-5638.
Parameter Values
Number of hidden layers 1
Number of neurons 100
Batch size 128
Number of epochs 150
Timing window 0.1s, 0.5s, 1s, 2s
Sequence size 15
Table 4: Hyper-parameters for LSTM model.
For training the LSTM models we used Python with Keras
and Tensorflow to build a Sequential model with one LSTM
layer with 100 hidden neurons and one Dense layer. We
used Mean Squared Error (MSE) as the loss function with
the ADAM optimization algorithm. Batch size of 128 was
used while training over 150 epochs, with a 20% validation
split. Our hyper-parameters are given in Table 4. We used 15
seconds of history for training the LSTMmodel, implemented
as 15 frequency vectors of length one-second each.
To select a threshold for detecting anomalies, we inspected
the distribution of anomaly scores for the frequency vectors
in our validation set (containing only legitimate data). In
Figure 5 we show the distribution of the distance between
predicted values and actual frequency values for the Struts
application with the enum_config script. We show the dis-
tance for attack and legitimate system calls, when using
either uniform weights, or TF-IDF weights for distance com-
putation. As observed, when using uniform weights the two
distance distribution are closer and overlap in some cases.
However, with TF-IDF weights, the separation between the
two distance distributions increases, making the attack data
much more distinguishable from the legitimate one. Thus,
we can select a threshold per application to minimize the
False Positive rate during training.
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Figure 6: ROC curves for enum_system for Struts with
CVE-2017-5638.
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(c) Struts CVE-2017-5638
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Figure 7: ROC curves for all 15 attack scripts (averaged) for PCA, OCSVM and LSTM for all applications.
Comparison of LSTM with traditional models. To compare
LSTM with the two traditional anomaly detection models
(PCA and OCSVM), Figure 6 shows the ROC curves for
one application (Struts) for the attack script enum_network.
We observe that LSTM is performing significantly better,
with AUC at 0.97, compared to 0.62 for PCA and 0.67 for
OCSVM. In the Appendix, we show in Figure 10 the ROC
curves for all attack scripts for the Struts application. In-
terestingly, LSTM is always outperforming the traditional
models, with significant increase in AUC. For instance, for
the ecryptfs_cred script, LSTM achieves an AUC of 0.96,
while PCA and OCSVM have AUCs of only 0.56 and 0.63,
respectively.
Figure 7 shows the ROC curves averaged on all 15 attack
scripts for the all the tested web applications. It is clear that
the LSTM model performs better than the traditional models.
The AUC for LSTM is between 0.75 and 0.97 and improves
the traditional models’ average AUC between 0.09 and 0.25.
LSTM for different attacks. Figures 8 and 9 show the ROC
curves for each attack for the Struts and Drupal applications,
respectively. The LSTM model generally performs better
than PCA or OCSVM There are a few attack scripts that per-
form poorly for the traditional models (e.g., ecryptfs_creds,
enum_configs, and enum_network), but the LSTM models
perform much better. We suspect that the reason is the abil-
ity of LSTM to analyze sequences of system call frequency
vectors. By looking at individual feature vectors for one time
window, the patterns of attack and legitimate data might be
very similar, but the sequences over multiple time windows
could differ significantly.
5 RELATEDWORK
Intrusion detection based on system call monitoring on end
hosts has been studied in depth in the literature. Forrest et
al. [10] create profiles of Unix process based on sequences of
system calls and detect deviations under attack. Hofmeyr et
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Figure 8: ROC curves for Struts with CVE-2017-5638 for all three models.
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Figure 9: ROC curves for Drupal for all three models.
al. [13] expand this by using fixed-length sequences andHam-
ming distances between unknown sequences and sequences
in the normal database for measuring dissimilarities. Warren-
der et al. [39] introduce threshold-based sequence time delay
embedding (t-STIDE), which implements an anomaly scoring
technique where the score of a test sequence depends on the
number of anomalous windows in the test sequence. Lane
and Brodley [17, 18] use UNIX shell command sequences to
build a user profile dictionary and propose various similar-
ity measures to detect anomalous behavior. Lee et al. [19]
propose an unsupervised learning method which generates
association rules from training data (using RIPPER) and use
these rules to detect anomalies in test data. Mutz et al. [25]
use Bayesian earning methods to model system call parame-
ters and detect anomalies in parameter values.
Ahmet et al. [1] propose anomaly detection models that
use both spatial and temporal features extracted from Win-
dows API calls. Markov models have been used to model
the temporal sequence of system calls and detect anomalies
(e.g., [21]). System call analysis has also been used for foren-
sic investigation [26]. More recently, anomaly detection of
system logs has been applied to enterprise networks [44] and
cloud deployments [7]. Beehive [44] uses PCA and clustering-
based methods to identify hosts with anomalous behavior
in an enterprise networks, while DeepLog [7] designs an
LSTMmodels that takes into account the sequence of system
log events in HDFS and OpenStack logs to identify various
anomalies.
In the area of web attacks, anomaly detection methods
have been applied to create profiles of application parame-
ters under normal conditions [16]. Bayesian networks have
been used to compose multiple models to reduce false pos-
itives [15]. Clustering anomalies has been used for more
detailed attack classification [29]. Spectogram [36] designs
a mixture of Markov chains based on n-gram features to
model the normal behavior of HTTP request parameters.
Swaddler [4] models the worflow of an application and uses
anomaly detection to identify when an application reaches
an inconsistent state. Scarcity of training data for client web
application has been mitigated by Robertson et al. [28] by us-
ing global similarity of web requests. Several papers [22, 34]
use a hybrid approach based on program analysis and ma-
chine learning for web application vulnerability detection.
Mutz et al. [24] use a combination of dynamic analysis and
learning to determine the context of system call invocation
and identify anomalous sequences of system calls.
Other defenses against Web application vulnerabilities are
based on either: (1) static analysis (e.g., [14]); (2) dynamic
analysis (e.g., [38]); (3) combination of static and dynamic
analysis (e.g., [2]); (3) input validation (e.g., [32]); and (4)
fuzz testing (e.g., [31]), but they have well-known limita-
tions. For instance, most static analysis tools have large false
positives, and input validation methods are specific to certain
web attacks such as SQL injection. We believe that machine
learning models can complement existing defenses in web
applications deployed in either public or private clouds.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
We proposed an anomaly detection framework for detecting
exploits in web application. We set up a testbed environ-
ment in which we deployed four popular web application,
recreated seven exploits using Metasploit modules, and col-
lected system call data using the Sysdig monitoring agent.
We compare two traditional anomaly detection models (PCA
and OCSVM) with an LSTM-model trained on sequences of
system call frequency vectors. We demonstrate that LSTM
outperforms the traditional models. Our framework has the
advantage of not requiring attack data for training, and being
applicable to a range of web application exploits. In future
work, interesting research questions apply on extending this
framework to other scenarios and running the algorithms
on data collected from real cloud environments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Vinny Parla, Andrew Zawadowskiy,
and Donovan O’Hara from Cisco for suggesting the area of
research and providing feedback and guidance during the
design and evaluation of AppMine. This project was funded
by a research gift from Cisco, as well as the NSF grant CNS-
1717634.
REFERENCES
[1] Faraz Ahmed, Haider Hameed, M. Zubair Shafiq, and Muddassar Fa-
rooq. Using spatio-temporal information in api calls with machine
learning algorithms for malware detection. In Proceedings of the 2nd
ACM Workshop on Security and Artificial Intelligence, AISec ’09, pages
55–62, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[2] Davide Balzarotti, Marco Cova, Vika Felmetsger, Nenad Jovanovic,
Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. Saner: Com-
posing static and dynamic analysis to validate sanitization in web
applications. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2008.
[3] Christopher M. Bishop. Pattern recognition and machine learning, 5th
Edition. Information science and statistics. Springer, 2007.
[4] Marco Cova, Davide Balzarotti, Viktoria Felmetsger, and Giovanni
Vigna. Swaddler: An approach for the anomaly-based detection of
state violations in web applications. In Christopher Kruegel, Richard
Lippmann, and Andrew Clark, editors, Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection, pages 63–86, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg.
[5] Docker - Build, Ship, and Run Any App, Anywhere. https://www.
docker.com/.
[6] Drupal. https://www.drupal.org/.
[7] Min Du, Feifei Li, Guineng Zheng, and Vivek Srikumar. Deeplog:
Anomaly detection and diagnosis from system logs through deep
learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security, CCS ’17, pages 1285–1298, New
York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[8] Michael Dymshits, Benjamin Myara, and David Tolpin. Process moni-
toring on sequences of system call count vectors. In Security Technology
(ICCST), 2017 International Carnahan Conference on, pages 1–5. IEEE,
2017.
[9] Cybersecurity incident and important consumer information. https:
//www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/, 2017.
[10] Stephanie Forrest, Steven A Hofmeyr, Anil Somayaji, and Thomas A
Longstaff. A sense of self for unix processes. In Security and Privacy,
1996. Proceedings., 1996 IEEE Symposium on, pages 120–128. IEEE, 1996.
[11] ftpbench. https://github.com/selectel/ftpbench.
[12] Sepp Hochreiter and Jurgen Schmidhuber. Long short-term memory.
Neural Computation, 9:1735âĂŞ–1780, 1997.
[13] Steven A Hofmeyr, Stephanie Forrest, and Anil Somayaji. Intrusion
detection using sequences of system calls. Journal of computer security,
6(3):151–180, 1998.
[14] Nenad Jovanovic, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda. Pixy: A static
analysis tool for detecting web application vulnerabilities (short paper).
In Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP ’06, pages 258–263, Washington, DC, USA, 2006. IEEE Computer
Society.
[15] Christopher Kruegel, Darren Mutz, William Robertson, and Fredrik
Valeur. Bayesian event classification for intrusion detection. In Pro-
ceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
ACSAC ’03, 2003.
[16] Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, andWilliam Robertson. Amulti-
model approach to the detection of web-based attacks. Comput. Netw.,
48(5):717–738, August 2005.
[17] Terran Lane and Carla E Brodley. An application of machine learning
to anomaly detection. In Proceedings of the 20th National Information
Systems Security Conference, volume 377, pages 366–380. Baltimore,
USA, 1997.
[18] Terran Lane, Carla E Brodley, et al. Sequence matching and learning
in anomaly detection for computer security. In AAAI Workshop: AI
Approaches to Fraud Detection and Risk Management, pages 43–49.
11
Providence, Rhode Island, 1997.
[19] Wenke Lee, Salvatore J Stolfo, et al. Data mining approaches for
intrusion detection. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 79–93. San
Antonio, TX, 1998.
[20] Lukasz Lenart. S2-052. https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/
WW/S2-052, 2017.
[21] Federico Maggi, Matteo Matteucci, and Stefano Zanero. Detecting
intrusions through system call sequence and argument analysis. IEEE
Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput., 7(4):381–395, October 2010.
[22] I. Medeiros, N. Neves, and M. Correia. Detecting and removing web
application vulnerabilities with static analysis and data mining. IEEE
Transactions on Reliability, 65(1):54–69, March 2016.
[23] Metasploit. https://www.metasploit.com/.
[24] Darren Mutz, William Robertson, Giovanni Vigna, and Richard Kem-
merer. Exploiting execution context for the detection of anomalous
system calls. In Christopher Kruegel, Richard Lippmann, and An-
drew Clark, editors, Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 1–20,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[25] DarrenMutz, Fredrik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, and Christopher Kruegel.
Anomalous system call detection. ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security (TISSEC), 9(1):61–93, 2006.
[26] S. Peisert, M. Bishop, S. Karin, and K. Marzullo. Analysis of computer
intrusions using sequences of function calls. Dependable and Secure
Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 4(2):137 –150, april-june 2007.
[27] The ProFTPD Project. http://www.proftpd.org/.
[28] William Robertson, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. Effec-
tive anomaly detection with scarce training data. In Proc. Network and
Distributed System Security Symp. (NDSS), 2010.
[29] William Robertson, Giovanni Vigna, Christopher Kruegel, and
Richard A. Kemmerer. Using generalization and characterization tech-
niques in the anomaly-based detection of web attacks. In Proc. Network
and Distributed System Security Symp. (NDSS), 2010.
[30] D. Rumelhart, G. Hinton, and R. Williams. Learning representations
by back-propagating errors. Nature, 323:533âĂŞ–536, 1986.
[31] Allister S., Kirda E., and Kruegel C. Leveraging user interactions for
in-depth testing of web applications. In Proceedings of Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection, RAID, 2008.
[32] Theodoor Scholte, William Robertson, Davide Balzarotti, and Engin
Kirda. Preventing input validation vulnerabilities in web applications
through automated type analysis. In Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 36th
Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference, COMPSAC ’12,
pages 233–243, Washington, DC, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer Society.
[33] Selenium - Web Browser Automation. https://www.seleniumhq.org/.
[34] L. K. Shar, L. C. Briand, and H. B. K. Tan. Web application vulnerability
prediction using hybrid program analysis and machine learning. IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 12(6):688–707, Nov
2015.
[35] Robin Sommer and Vern Paxson. Outside the closed world: On us-
ing machine learning for network intrusion detection. In 2010 IEEE
symposium on security and privacy, pages 305–316. IEEE, 2010.
[36] Yingbo Song, Angelos D Keromytis, and Salvatore Stolfo. Spectrogram:
A mixture-of-markov-chains model for anomaly detection in web
traffic. In Proc. Network and Distributed System Security Symp. (NDSS),
2009.
[37] Sysdig: Open Source Container Troubleshooting & Forensics. https:
//sysdig.com/opensource/.
[38] Philipp Vogt, Florian Nentwich, Nenad Jovanovic, Engin Kirda, Christo-
pher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. Cross-site scripting prevention
with dynamic data tainting and static analysis. In Proceedings of the
14th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS,
2007.
[39] Christina Warrender, Stephanie Forrest, and Barak Pearlmutter. De-
tecting intrusions using system calls: Alternative data models. In
Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (Cat.
No. 99CB36344), pages 133–145. IEEE, 1999.
[40] Blog Tool, Publishing Platform, and CMS - WordPress. https://
wordpress.org/.
[41] wpajaxloadmore. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38660.
[42] wpnmedia. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36810.
[43] wpreflexgallery. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36809.
[44] Ting-Fang Yen, Alina Oprea, Kaan Onarlioglu, Todd Leetham,
William K. Robertson, Ari Juels, and Engin Kirda. Beehive: Large-scale
log analysis for detecting suspicious activity in enterprise networks.
In Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC ’13, New
Orleans, LA, USA, December 9-13, 2013, pages 199–208, 2013.
A ROC CURVES FOR ATTACKS
In Figure 10 we show the ROC curves for PCA, OCSVM, and
LSTM for all 15 attack scripts for the Struts application with
the Equifax exploit (CVE-2017-5638). We generated similar
ROC curves for all applications, exploits, and attack scripts,
but omit them here due to space limitations.
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Figure 10: ROC curves for attack scripts for Struts CVE-2017-5638
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